The 1800 Presidential Election in which Vice President Thomas Jefferson defeated President John Adams was historical for several reasons.
With the advent of political parties, however, the inadequacies of this system were soon laid bare. In 1796, Alexander Hamilton, Washington’s influential Treasury Secretary (and arguably, the Assistant President) and Adams’ rival for leadership of the Federalist Party, tried to manipulate things so that Adams, the party’s nominee for President, would end up getting fewer votes than the party’s VP nominee. Instead, his plan ended up backfiring, as Democratic-Republican Presidential nominee Jefferson ended up getting the second-most votes and the Vice Presidency.
Four years later, Hamilton was up to his usual tricks. Still hoping to take down Adams and elect a Federalist more to his liking, Hamilton authored a scathing 54-page pamphlet criticizing Adams that was meant to be circulated amongst the Federalist Party to convince them to abandon the incumbent President. Instead, the pamphlet became public, dealing Adams a serious blow while exposing Hamilton’s duplicity and earning him the enmity of a large portion of his own party.
So, in 1800, the Democratic-Republicans were smelling victory. And they had a plan to avoid a situation where a Federalist might sneak into the Vice Presidency. They would have all of their electors cast their first vote for Jefferson. Then, all but one would cast their second ballot for New Yorker Aaron Burr, the party’s nominee for VP.
Only it didn’t happen. Thanks to poor planning, lack of communication and assumptions that ended up not coming true, Democratic-Republican electors cast each of their votes for Jefferson and Burr, resulting in a tie atop the Electoral College.
Now, the party had clearly intended for Jefferson to be President, and it’s been argued that Burr could have simply conceded the race or opted not to contest the contingent election. But the Constitution wasn’t clear about what his options were. What if, by conceding or not contesting the contingent election, Burr forfeited his intended spot as VP, leaving Adams as the #2, something no Democratic-Republican wanted? If he wanted to be VP, he had to be elected, and the only way to do that under the circumstances was through the House.
Burr, for his part, remained silent but historians agree that he either waged a stealth campaign to steal the Presidency form Jefferson or sat back and let things play out, hoping they would go in his favor. In 2011, Thomas Baker discovered a letter from New York lawyer William Van Ness, a close Burr associate (he would be Burr’s second in the Hamilton duel), trying to recruit other Democratic-Republican Representatives to back Burr. In his letter, Van Ness said that the sentiments expressed were “not mine only” — leading Baker to argue that he could have been referring to Burr, himself.
The House Where It Happened
Of course, all of this would have been academic had the House, with each state getting one vote, simply voted for Jefferson and while giving Burr enough votes to come in second.
Unfortunately for the Democratic-Republicans, the lame duck House that would be deciding the election was controlled by Federalists — and they were in no mood to help their rivals sort out their mess. In fact, sensing an opportunity, they conspired to vote for Burr, who they thought would be more malleable than his running mate. Plus, they hated Jefferson for starting the Democratic-Republican Party in the first place, and wanted to stick it to him.
However, Federalists did not control enough state delegations to see their plan to come to fruition. So, from February 11–17, 1801, the House held 35 ballots and failed to elect either Jefferson or Burr. If Federalists held out for another three weeks, Secretary of State John Marshall could have become Acting President (although he had already been confirmed as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, which means he would have to either decline the Presidency or resign the Chief Justiceship — another fascinating “what if?”).
Watching from the sidelines, Hamilton had seen enough. Hamilton disliked Jefferson and disagreed with him on almost every major issue. However, he also had a grudging respect for Jefferson and saw him as a man of principle — he just found those principles in total conflict with his own.
On the other hand, Hamilton despised Burr and saw him as nothing more than a charlatan and empty suit who would do or say anything for power. Taking the “lesser of two evils” approach, Hamilton decided to throw his support to Jefferson, figuring a man with the wrong principles was better than one with none at all. Despite his influence having admittedly waned since the Adams pamphlet incident, Hamilton engaged in a fierce letter writing campaign to make sure Burr did not become President.
“There is no circumstance which has occurred in the course of our political affairs that has given me so much pain as the idea that Mr. Burr might be elevated to the presidency by the means of the Federalists,” Hamilton wrote to Oliver Wolcott in December 1800.
“Burr loves nothing but himself; thinks of nothing but his own aggrandizement; and will be content with nothing short of permanent power in his own hands” Hamilton wrote to Rep. Harrison Gray Otis (F-MA).
“Mr. Burr [is] the most unfit man in the U.S. for the office of president,” Hamilton wrote to Rep. James Bayard — a Federalist and Delaware’s lone representative. “Disgrace abroad, ruin at home are the probable fruits of his elevation.”
According to Ron Chernow’s Hamilton, the former Treasury Secretary spent two months lobbying Bayard to abandon Burr. Bayard, for his part, also disliked Burr, but was under tremendous pressure from his fellow Federalists to hold the line. “Quite possibly influenced by Hamilton’s barrage of letters,” Bayard engaged in back-channel talks with some of Jefferson’s allies and tried to exact promises that Jefferson would “preserve Hamilton’s financial system, maintain the navy, and retain Federalist bureaucrats below cabinet levels.”
Once word got back to Bayard that he need not worry about those things, according to Chernow, the Representative made his move. On the 36th ballot, Bayard abstained, taking Delaware out of Burr’s column. Bayard’s allies in Vermont and Maryland also abstained, flipping those states to Jefferson and giving him a majority. Angry Federalists decried what they saw as a deal between Jefferson and Bayard — not the first time an allegation of a “corrupt bargain” would roil a Presidential election.
“Jefferson probably owed his victory to Hamilton as much as as to any other politician,” Chernow wrote. “Hamilton’s pamphlet had first dealt a blow to Adams, though not a mortal one, and he had then intervened to squelch Burr’s chances for the presidency, paving the way for a Federalist deal with Jefferson.”
The long process took its toll on whatever relationship Burr and Jefferson had. Jefferson never trusted Burr again and kept him on the sidelines in his administration. He even dumped Burr as his running mate in 1804 and later had him tried for treason, accusing his former VP of trying to establish his own country in parts of what is now the southwestern U.S. and Florida. He was ultimately acquitted thanks to Marshall, the presiding judge who construed the definition of treason narrowly, all but guaranteeing the result.
As for Hamilton, he and Burr escalated their feud. Hamilton helped cost Burr the New York gubernatorial race in 1804, writing a letter so scathing and critical that Burr felt dishonored and demanded satisfaction. The two then engaged in their infamous duel at Weehawken and, we all know how that turned out.
